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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(b)
because this case is an appeal from the district court review of adjudicative
proceedings of the Duchesne County Commission.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
ISSUE NO. 1: Does the marshaled evidence demonstrate that respondent
Duchesne County ("the County") clearly erred in finding that the Hancocks'1
proposed residential treatment facility was not compatible with other land uses in
the general neighborhood?
Since the district court's review of the County's decision was limited to a
review of the County's record, no particular deference is accorded to the district
court's decision and this Court must review the County's decision as if the appeal
had come directly from the County. The standard for this Court's review of the
County's decision is whether the County's decision was arbitrary or capricious
which is the same standard established in Utah Code §17-27-708 for the district
court's review. Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah
App. 1995). An administrative land use decision made by a county is arbitrary and
capricious if not supported by substantial evidence. Davis County v. Clearfield
City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988). The substantial evidence test is defined as
"that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
1

Petitioners D. Brad Hancock, John D. Hancock, Tyson B. Hancock, Beau D.
Hancock and Uintah Mountain RTC LLC are referred to collectively as "the
Hancocks".
1

reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First National Bank of Boston v.
County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990).
This issue was preserved for review by the arguments and authorities that
the Hancocks presented in their briefs and in their oral argument to the district
court.
ISSUE NO. 2: Does the marshaled evidence demonstrate that the County
clearly erred in finding that the site of the Hancocks' proposed residential
treatment facility was not served by streets of sufficient capacity to carry the
traffic generated by the facility?
The standard of review for this issue is the same as the standard of review
for Issue No. 1.
This issue was preserved for review by the arguments and authorities that
the Hancocks presented in their briefs and in their oral argument to the district
court.
ISSUE NO. 3: Does the marshaled evidence demonstrate that the County
clearly erred in finding that the Hancocks' proposed residential treatment facility
will not be detrimental to the public safety?
The standard of review for this issue is the same as the standard of review
for Issue No. 1.
This issue was preserved for review by the arguments and authorities that
the Hancocks presented in their briefs and in their oral argument to the district
court.
2

ISSUE NO. 4: Was the decision of the County to limit the Uintah Mountain
RTC to no more than ten students illegal because it did not serve a legitimate
public purpose?
Under Utah Code §17-27-708 the County's decision must be reversed if it
violates a statute, ordinance or existing law. This Court reviews such issues for
correctness, according no deference to the district court. See, e.g., Kessimakis v.
Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah. App. 1999).
This issue was preserved for review by the arguments and authorities that
the Hancocks presented in their briefs and in their oral argument to the district
court.
ISSUE NO. 5: Did the district court err in determining that the County's
action in denying the Hancocks a conditional use permit for a residential treatment
center did not violate the federal and state Fair Housing Acts?
The standard of review for this issue is the same as the standard of review
for Issue No. 4.
This issue was preserved for review by the arguments and authorities that
the Hancocks presented in their briefs and in their oral argument to the district
court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case
This is an action brought pursuant to Utah Code §17-27-708 for review of a
decision of respondent Duchesne County denying petitioners D. Brad Hancock,
3

John D. Hancock, Tyson B. Hancock, Beau D. Hancock and Uintah Mountain
RTC LLC a conditional use permit ("CUP") to operate a residential treatment
facility in Duchesne County, Utah.
2. Course of Proceedings Below
The Hancocks filed their petition for review on May 4, 2004. (R. at 3) The
County filed its answer to the petition on June 23, 2004. (R. at 13) On September
14, 2004 the Hancocks filed their opening brief. (R. at 36) On October 13, 2004
the County filed its answering brief. (R. at 66) On October 28, 2004 the Hancocks
filed their reply brief. (R. at 80) On December 2, 2004 the district court held oral
argument and took the matter under advisement. (R. at 103)
3. Disposition in the District Court
On December 21, 2004 the district court issued its ruling affirming the
County's decision and denying the Hancocks all relief. (R. at 105)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioners D. Brad Hancock, John D. Hancock, Tyson B. Hancock and
Beau D. Hancock are members of the William DeVere Hancock family which for
many years has owned a small family farm ("the Hancock Farm") located in the
Hancock Cove area in Duchesne County, Utah. (R. at 4; R. at 13)2 In 2001, the
Hancock family purchased a five-acre parcel of land ("the Hancock Parcel")
immediately adjacent to the Hancock Farm. Located on the Hancock Parcel was a

2

H 3.1 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
4

residence which Petitioner D. Brad Hancock commenced to remodel in 2003. (R.
at 4; R. at 13) Both the Hancock Farm and the Hancock Parcel are zoned A-5
which is an agricultural-residential zoning category with a five acre minimum lot
size. (R. at 4; R. at 13)4
In 1997, the County granted a CUP to Cedar Ridge RTC ("Cedar Ridge")
to operate a residential treatment center in an area of Duchesne County also zoned
A-5. (R. at 4; R. at 13)5 Petitioner John D. Hancock worked as a counselor at
Cedar Ridge RTC and as a result of that experience, determined that the Hancock
Farm was an ideal location for a similar residential treatment center. (R. at 5; R. at
13)6 When his family acquired the Hancock Parcel in 2001, he and the other
members of his family made plans to establish a residential treatment center on the
Hancock Parcel. (R. at 5; R. at 13) This residential treatment center, which the
Hancocks named the Uintah Mountain Residential Treatment Center ("Uintah
Mountain RTC"), was to be housed initially in the existing structure on the
Hancock Parcel which Petitioner D. Brad Hancock was then remodeling. (R. at 5;

"1

9

Tj 3.2 and f3.3 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in
its Answer.
4
TI 3.4 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
5
^f 3.7 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
6
T| 3.9 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
\ 3.9 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
5

R. at 13) Petitioner Uintah Mountain RTC LLC was formed for the purpose of
operating the Uintah Mountain RTC. (R. at 5; R. at 13)9
Sections 17.52.030 and 17.52.052 of the Duchesne County Code allow a
"group home" in an A-5 zone as a conditional use. Included within the definition
of a "group home" is a residential treatment facility such as Cedar Ridge RTC
which applied for and received a CUP in 1997. (R. at 5; R. at 13)w In order to
obtain a CUP for a group home, an applicant must meet four conditions:
() the location of the group home must be compatible with other land
uses in the general neighborhood;
() the site of the group home must be of sufficient size to accommodate
the group home together with all yards, open spaces, walls and
fences, parking and loading facilities and landscaping, as required by
the zoning ordinance;
() the site of the group home must be served by streets of sufficient
capacity to carry the traffic generated by the group home; and
() the group home, if otherwise in compliance with the CUP, will not
adversely affect other property in the vicinity or affect the general
welfare of the county.

T[ 3.9 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
9
f 3.9 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
10
^ 3.7 and ^3.9 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in
its Answer.

(R.at4;R.atl3)u
In addition to meeting these four conditions, an applicant must also meet
three other conditions required for all CUPs by Section 17.52.050 of the Duchesne
County Code:
() the proposed use at the proposed location will not be unduly
detrimental or injurious to property or improvements in the vicinity
and will not be detrimental to the public health, safety or general
welfare;
() the proposed use will be located and conducted in compliance with
the goals and policies of the Duchesne County General Plan and the
purposes of the zoning ordinance; and
() the property for which the use, building or other structure is
proposed is of adequate size and dimensions to permit the conduct of
the use in such a manner that will not be materially detrimental to
adjoining and surrounding properties.
(R. at 4; R. at 13)12
On September 15, 2003 the Hancocks submitted an application for a CUP
to the Planning Commission, seeking approval to operate the Uintah Mountain
RTC on the Hancock Parcel. (R. at 11:1)

11

f 3.6 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
f 3.5 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
7

The Planning Commission held public hearings on the Hancocks'
application for a CUP on November 5, 2003 and December 3, 2003, at which time
the Hancocks presented documentary and testimonial evidence in support of their
CUP application. (R. at 5; R. at 13) Also in attendance at the two public hearings
were a number of individuals who opposed approval of the CUP. (R. at 5; R. at
13)14

Based on the evidence received at the hearings on November 5, 2003 and
December 3, 2003, the Planning Commission unanimously determined that: (a) the
location of the Uintah Mountain RTC would be compatible with other land uses in
the general neighborhood; (b) the site of the Uintah Mountain RTC would be of
sufficient size to accommodate the facility together with all yards, open spaces,
walls and fences, parking and loading facilities and landscaping, as required by the
zoning ordinance; (c) the site of the Uintah Mountain RTC would be served by
streets of sufficient capacity to carry the traffic expected to be generated by the
facility; and (d) the Uintah Mountain RTC, if otherwise in compliance with the
conditional use permit, would not adversely affect other property in the vicinity or
affect the general welfare of the county. (R. at 7; R. at 13)15

Tf 3.12 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
14
f 3.18 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
15
f 3.12 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
8

Based on the evidence received at the hearings on November 5, 2003 and
December 3, 2003, the Planning Commission unanimously determined that: (a) the
Uintah Mountain RTC would not be unduly detrimental or injurious to property or
improvements in the vicinity and would not be detrimental to the public health,
safety or general welfare; (b) the Uintah Mountain RTC would be located and
conducted in compliance with the goals and policies of the Duchesne County
General Plan and the purposes of the zoning ordinance; and (c) the Hancock
Parcel and the existing structure on the Hancock Parcel were of adequate size and
dimensions to permit the conduct of the Uintah Mountain RTC in such a manner
that will not be materially detrimental to adjoining and surrounding properties. (R.
at 7; R. at 13)16

At the conclusion of the December 3, 2003 public meeting, the Planning
Commission unanimously approved the Hancocks' CUP application on condition
that the Hancocks:
() limit the number of young men residing in the facility at any one
time to ten or, if required by the State of Utah, a number less than
ten;
() install an alarm system;
() conduct monthly public relations meetings with neighbors;
0 provide a definition of "significant criminal background";

16

T| 3.19 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
9

() show proof of liability insurance; and
() comply with all other rules and regulations, including those
contained within the Hancocks' original application as well as
applicable state and federal laws.
(R. at 7; R. at 13)17
Thereafter individuals who had opposed the issuance of the CUP at the
hearings before the Planning Commission appealed the Planning Commission's
decision to the County pursuant to Section 17.32.030 of the Duchesne County
Code, the Hancocks cross-appealed, contending that the Planning Commission had
erred in limiting the number of students to ten.
On March 9, 2004, the County held a public hearing on both appeals and on
April 5, 2004, rendered and adopted a written decision in which it first rejected the
Hancocks' appeal of the Planning Commission's decision to limit the Uintah
Mountain RTC to no more than ten students:
"We have reviewed the record and considered all submissions, and
have discussed all of the issues of concern. In regards to the
Hancock appeal, claiming that the Planning Commission's limitation
on the capacity of the treatment center was arbitrary and capricious,
we find that the Planning Commission granted the Hancocks what
they asked for and what could be substantiated from the application.
The limit often (10) was also the maximum allowed for the single
structure. No other evidence was presented to support a larger
facility to accommodate 16 or 50 young men. We find no evidence
that the Planning Commission's limitation was arbitrary or
capricious, and therefore we deny the appeal of the Hancocks." (R.
at 12:544)
TJ 3.20 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
10

The County then went on to overturn the decision of the Planning
Commission to issue a CUP to the Hancocks for a ten-bed facility:
In regards to the appeal of the neighbors, that the Planning
Commission's decision was not supported by the evidence, we find
that there was insufficient evidence provided to address the issues of
safety, traffic and compatibility of the use to justify making the
findings necessary to grant the conditional use. The area is clearly
residential and agricultural, and from all that was presented we find
that Hancocks proposals are a commercial venture and not
compatible with the area. The Planning Commission found that the
single structure on five acres could be compatible with the area, if
they met certain conditions. We agree that a single structure on five
acres could be compatible to the area, but we disagree that this
project could be compatible. It is clear that a single structure on five
acres is inadequate for the Hancocks' needs and a larger project will
be needed to be a viable venture. There has been nothing presented
in the application, the two hearings before the Planning Commission,
or the hearing before us, the County Commission, to convince us
that the Uintah Mountain Residential Treatment Center is a viable
project, nor could it be a compatible use in this area. We, therefore,
overturn the decision of the planning commission and deny the
conditional use permit issued for the Uintah Mountain Residential
Treatment Center in the Hancock Cove area. (R. at 12:544-45)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The County's decision to deny the Hancocks a CUP for the Uintah
Mountain RTC must be reversed because (a) it was based exclusively on "public
clamor" which is insufficient as a matter of law to justify denying a CUP for a
residential treatment center; and (b) it clearly violates both state and federal Fair
Housing Acts because the decision was based on the familial status of the persons
who will reside at the Uintah Mountain RTC.

11

The County's decision to limit the number of students residing at the
Uintah Mountain RTC to ten is illegal because it serves no legitimate public
interest and must therefore be reversed.
ARGUMENTS
1. The marshaled evidence demonstrates that the County clearly erred in
finding that the Uintah Mountain RTC was not compatible with other
land uses in the general neighborhood.
To meet their burden in challenging factual determinations on appeal, the
Hancocks are required to marshal the relevant evidence for this Court. See Utah R.
App. 24(a)(9). Marshalling requires the Hancocks to collect all the evidence
supporting the challenged finding, then demonstrate that such evidence, viewed
most favorably to the non-appealing party, still renders the decision below clearly
erroneous. See, e.g., McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1992).
A review of the marshaled evidence and the record as a whole demonstrates that
the County's finding cannot be sustained.
The following evidence in the record arguably supports the County's
finding that the Hancocks' proposed residential treatment facility was not
compatible with other land uses in the general neighborhood:
0 The proposed treatment facility is a "commercial venture". (R. at 1)
() The area in which the Hancocks propose to locate their treatment
facility is residential and agricultural. (R. at 12:541)

12

To show that the County's finding on this issue cannot be sustained on the
basis of the marshaled evidence, it is not necessary to look beyond the County's
Decision on Appeal:
"The Planning Commission found that the single structure on five
acres could be compatible with the area, if they met certain
conditions. We agree that a single structure on five acres could be
compatible to the area..." (R. at 12:545)
"the planning commission approved the modified single-family
residence on the five acres for the conditional use. This, we think,
was in keeping with the character of the neighborhood." (R. at
12:543)
Thus the County twice states in its Decision that the ten-bed facility which
the Planning Commission approved for issuance of a CUP was a compatible use.
The County seems to have reasoned that the CUP for a ten-bed facility
should have been denied because the evidence was insufficient to support the
findings necessary for issuance of a CUP for a fifty-bed facility:
"It is clear that a single structure on five acres is inadequate for the
Hancocks' needs and a larger project will be needed to be a viable
venture. There has been nothing presented in the application, the two
hearings before the Planning Commission, or the hearing before us,
the County Commission, to convince us that the Uintah Mountain
Residential Treatment Center is a viable project, or could be a
compatible use in this area." (R. at 12:545)

Concerns and issues regarding the fifty-bed facility are obviously relevant
to the Hancocks' appeal of the Planning Commission's denial of a CUP for a
facility of that size; but they are irrelevant on the issue of whether the Planning

13

Commission's decision to issue a CUP for the ten-bed facility should be
overturned.
Both the County and the Planning Commission found that a ten-bed facility
in a single structure on five acres could be compatible with the area. That finding
is clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record:
() At any given time the total number of persons at the facility would
be approximately thirteen (ten students and three staff persons), a
number approximating the size of a large family. (R. at 11:13;
12:301)
(} The admission criteria show that the students will not include gang
members, sexual offenders, drug addicts, juvenile delinquents or
persons with a history of violence; rather, the students will
demonstrate emotional problems familiar to everyone: obesity, low
self-esteem, a drop in academic performance, a breakdown in family
relationships, depression, experimental drug and/or alcohol use and
attention deficit hyper-activity disorder. (R. at 6; R. at 13)18
() Students at Uintah Mountain RTC will be home-schooled and will
remain at the facility so that there will be little or no interaction
between the students and neighbors. (R. at 11:14)

f 3.13 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
14

(} Cedar Ridge has for years operated a similar facility in Duchesne
County. No one at any of the hearings presented evidence that Cedar
Ridge was an incompatible use. (R. at 12:333)
In sum, the County's finding that a ten-bed treatment facility was
incompatible with other land uses in the area is not supported by substantial
evidence and must be reversed.
2. The marshaled evidence demonstrates that the County clearly erred in
finding that the site of the Uintah Mountain RTC was not served by
streets of sufficient capacity to carry the traffic generated by the facility.
In order to obtain a CUP, the Hancocks were obliged to show that the
Uintah Mountain RTC was served by streets of sufficient capacity to carry the
traffic generated by the facility. The County's finding with respect to this issue is
as follows:
"we find that there was insufficient evidence provided to address the
issues of safety, traffic and compatibility of use to justify making
the findings necessary to grant the conditional use." [emphasis
supplied] (R. at 12:544).
In an effort to discharge their obligation to marshal evidence that supports
this finding, the Hancocks have combed the record and are unable to point to any
evidence which even arguably supports a finding that their proposed facility would
not be served by streets of sufficient capacity to carry the traffic generated by the
facility. In its decision, the County does not identify any evidence to support a
finding to that effect but rather acknowledges that substantial evidence exists in
15

the record to support a finding that the proposed facility would in fact be served by
streets of sufficient capacity to carry the traffic generated by the facility:
"There is sufficient evidence in the record to support...condition (3)
regarding streets sufficient to carry the traffic generated by the use as
is presently granted, i.e. a single residence structure on five acres
with a maximum of 10 young men." (R. at 12:543)
Of course the County was absolutely correct concerning the existence of
such evidence:
(} In his remarks to the County on March yth, 2004, Deputy County
Attorney Roland Uresk acknowledged that " there was no evidence
that there would be an undue increase in the traffic..." . (R. at
12:408)
() Petitioner Brad Hancock advised the County that the road leading to
the property had been recently paved, was in good condition and
held little traffic. (R. at 12:340)
() The residents will be home-schooled at the facility and the staff will
for the most part live at the facility. (R. at 12:297)
(} At the hearing before the Planning Commission on December 3,
2003, Petitioner Braddock Hancock explained that there might be a
food truck making deliveries once a month and that there might be a
trip to the doctor every other day but other than that, not much
additional traffic. (R. at 12:297)

16

{) The access road moreover is a dead-end road which means that the
only traffic on that road will be the vehicles traveling to the
properties on the road. There will be no through traffic. (R. at
11:182)
() The Chairman of the Planning Commission noted that "traffic wasn't
a big deal." (R. at 11:183)
Here again, the County seems to have reasoned that the CUP for a ten-bed
facility should have been denied because the evidence was insufficient to support
the findings necessary for issuance of a CUP for a fifty-bed facility. The County's
finding on this issue is unsupported by any evidence and should be reversed.
3. The marshaled evidence demonstrates that the County clearly erred in
finding that the Uintah Mountain RTC will not be detrimental to the
public safety.
Unlike the findings concerning traffic and compatibility of use for which
little or no evidence could be marshaled to support the finding, there is
considerable evidence that can be marshaled to support the County's finding that
the Uintah Mountain RTC will be detrimental to the public safety. As the
Hancocks will show however, this evidence is nothing more than "public clamor"
which this Court has previously held to be insufficient as a matter of law to justify
denial of a CUP for a residential treatment center.
The evidence in the record that arguably supports the County's finding that
the Hancocks' proposed ten-bed facility will be detrimental to the public safety
17

consists of letters (R. at 11:70-105) and testimony from objecting neighbors (R. at
11:162-181) The following are the most relevant excerpts from the letters.
() "Can Mr. Hancock guarantee these boys will not run away? Can he
guarantee the safety of our children, homes and property if they run
away?"(K. at 11:70)
() "I am very troubled over the possibility that a Uintah Mountain
Treatment Center for troubled youth would possibly be allowed to
open in a residential area surrounded by homes and families." (R. at
11:71)
() "I am opposed to a facility for disoriented youth in a residential area.
I am concerned with possible infractions that they may commit in
the future, a possibility common sense could not negate." (R. at
11:73)
() "A treatment center for troubled youth created an uneasy an unsure
atmosphere for anyone who is within walking distance of the
facility." (H. at 11:75)
() "We believe the placement of this center will only benefit those who
will be living in the comfort of their own home at a substantial
distance, with no risk of depreciation for their property or the
compromised safety and security of their families." (R. at 11:77)
() "We do not want any added worry of whether our son and property
will be safe. And we are aware of the definite risk we take by living
close to this type of facility." (R. at 11:82)
() "We the undersigned feel there would be a great risk for Vandalism
with our homes, livestock, property and our pets." (R. at 11:84)
() ".. .way of life will be threatened if the treatment center is allowed.."
(R. at 11:85)
() "If somehow the youth should escape, What kind of damage can
they do to our families, our property, our homes, our animals , our
vehicles and other property?" (R. at 11:86)
() "I do not want a boys home in our area." (R. at 11:88)
() "We know that the appropriate measure would be taken to ensure
our safety but as it has been seen all over in situations like this, there
is always something that will happen sooner or later...Why should
we have to settle for it being built in our backyard?" (R. at 11:89)
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^ "Therefore we are very concerned that we would lose what we value
in our neighborhood - the safety of our children, the safety of our
property, and our way of life." (R. at 11:90)
0 "We feel that this will endanger our children, our homes, our
vehicles and our security.. .This scares us..." (R. at 11:91)
The testimony of the objecting neighbors reiterates these same concerns
which are nothing more than generalized fears unconnected to the Hancocks'
proposed facility. Deputy County Attorney Ursek characterized these fears in his
remarks to the County, "there was no evidence indicating that these fears or these
things would actually be applicable to this particular facility. Those fears were in
facilities in general." (R. at 12:408) Deputy Ursek assured the County that "There
was no evidence...that the operations of this facility would adversely affect the
adjoining property owners." (R. at 12:408)
It is interesting to note that the County in its Decision on Appeal in
addressing the issue of safety did nothing more than articulate these generalized
fears:
"The neighbors have also raised the issues of safety. No matter how
you characterize it this is a facility for troubled youth, and troubled
youth have their problems. There is evidence in the record that these
types of facilities do have escapees and sometimes the escapees
cause injury to persons and property." (R. at 12:543-44)
This Court has characterized these kinds of objections as "public clamor"
and has ruled that public clamor cannot serve as a basis for denying a conditional
use permit. In Davis County v Clearfield City, supra, the applicants sought a
conditional use permit for a substance abuse residential program. The application
was denied by both the city planning commission and the city council. After a
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trial de novo however, the trial court issued a writ of mandamus for the city and
the planning commission to issue the permit, finding that there was no believable
information or evidence on which the city council could have rationally believed
that the proposed mental health facility would pose any special threat to the city's
legitimate interest. 756 P.2d at 711. There was a concern that the proposed facility
would create a danger or nuisance because of its proximity to the junior high
school but no school official appeared at the public hearings to oppose the
proposed facility. With regard to concerns about real estate values there were no
studies made and no opinions were given by professional real estate appraisers nor
was any credible evidence of reduced property values produced at the hearings.
This Court upheld the trial court's decision:
"While the reasons given by the Clearfield City Council for denying
the permit might be legally sufficient if supported, the trial court was
correct in concluding that the offered reasons are without factual
basis in the record. What the court found to be the real reason for
the action, 'public clamor,' is not an adequate legal basis for the
city's decision."
756P.2dat712.
In Wealth L. Wadsworth Construction, Inc. v West Jordan City, 999 P.2d
1240 (Utah App. 2000), the landowner filed an application for a conditional use
permit for outdoor storage of construction equipment. Under the West Jordan City
ordinance, outdoor storage in the applicable zoning classification was permitted if
the storage was located behind the front and the street building line, was screened
from the street with an adequate fence to be determined by the planning
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commission and was not deemed by the planning commission or city council to be
a nuisance. The city council denied the conditional use permit and gave four
reasons:
1. The city made a significant investment in bringing a large industrial
employer to the area and wanted to maintain the positive attributes that they had
used to attract that employer to the city. The city felt outdoor storage would be
detrimental to the area making the area less attractive and also be injurious to the
goals of the city.
2. Outdoor storage may be considered a nuisance to neighboring property
owners.
3. Outdoor storage would encompass the majority of the parcel resulting in
an intensity of outdoor storage different than existed on neighboring properties.
4. Outdoor storage was detrimental to the existing and future businesses in
the area and not harmonious with the goals of the city.
This Court determined that these findings were not sufficient to justify
denial of the conditional use permit.

Concerns expressed by neighboring

landowners in the absence of an independent investigation by the commission's
staff were not sufficient to establish that the outdoor storage would be adverse to
the city's goals. This Court cited Davis County v. Clearfield City, supra, for the
proposition that an application for conditional use permit may not be based solely
on adverse public comment.
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This Court also noted that concerns raised by neighboring property owners
to the effect that the outdoor storage might be considered a nuisance or result in
increased road traffic and dust were insufficient to justify denial of the conditional
use permit because there was no finding that the outdoor storage would actually
constitute a nuisance. Finally there was no evidence to support the city's finding
that the proposed storage was significantly different from that of neighboring
properties and would be detrimental to existing and future business in the area.
This Court noted that in fact the evidence showed there were several other parcels
near the landowners of property which had outdoor storage areas similar to that
proposed by the landowners. For these reasons this Court held that the city
council's decision to deny the conditional use application was not supported by the
evidence and was therefore arbitrary and capricious.
There was, on the other hand, substantial evidence in the record to support
the finding that the Uintah Mountain RTC will not be detrimental to the public
safety. The Hancocks have always recognized that safety is a legitimate concern
and were mindful of the importance of presenting evidence concerning safety to
the Planning Commission. A review of the record shows clearly that evidence of
safety, rather than being non-existent, was in fact abundant.
Petitioner John Hancock, the first speaker at the November 5, 2003 meeting
of the Planning Commission, pointed out that residential treatment centers are
required to be licensed by the state of Utah and are heavily regulated by Utah's
Department of Human Services ("DHS"). (R. at 11:155) He drew the Planning
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Commission's attention to rules and standards adopted by DHS with which the
Uintah Mountain RTC would have to comply in order to obtain a license. (R. at
11:155) The applicable DHS rules and standards contain the following provisions
dealing with safety:
{) There must be access at the facility to an operable 24-hour telephone
service. Telephone numbers for emergency assistance, i.e., 911 and
poison control, shall be posted. (R. at 11:26)
0

Compliance with local fire safety regulations and local health codes
must be documented. (R. at 11:31)

() There must be a written plan of action for disaster and casualties,
including a plan for evacuation, transportation and relocation of
students when necessary and supervision of students after evacuation
or relocation. (R. at 11:26)
() Policies and procedures designed to prevent or control infectious and
communicable diseases in accordance with local, state and federal
health standards must be adopted. (R. at 11:26)
(} Hazardous chemicals and materials must be kept under locked
storage according to the direction of local fire authorities. (R. at
11:33)
() Medications must also be kept in locked storage. (R. at 11:33)
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0 Before admission, students must be tested for tuberculosis. Both
students and staff must be tested annually or as directed by the local
health authority. (R. at 11:34)
() The program must provide DHS with written documentation
showing compliance with local fire safety regulations and local
health codes. (R. at 11:31)
John Hancock went on to provide to the Planning Commission the
following additional information about the Uintah Mountain RTC program
touching the issue of safety:
(} The staff/student ratio would be 1 to 4, as required by state law.
Students would be monitored twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. (R. at 11:155)
() The program will treat adolescent males between the ages of 12 and
17 suffering from low self-esteem, a drop in academic performance,
a breakdown in family relationships, depression, experimental drug
and/or alcohol use and attention deficit hyper-activity disorder. The
program would not accept applicants with a history of violence,
sexual offenses or significant criminal background. (R. at 11:15556)
0 Applicants to the program will be required to undergo a thorough
screening process. This will include the completion of an extensive
questionnaire, a review of their academic records and a review of
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their criminal history. Additionally, each applicant will be evaluated
by a state licensed psychologist. (R. at 11:156)
() John Hancock presented the Planning Commission with a May 2003
Fact Sheet from the Institute for Public Strategies which referenced
studies showing that crime levels in areas next to residential
treatment centers were consistently lower than elsewhere in the same
area. (R. at 11:14)
The Uintah Mountain RTC will not be Duschesne County's first residential
treatment center. That honor belongs to the Cedar Ridge which received a CUP
from Duchesne County in 1997. (R. at 12:333) Petitioner John Hancock presented
dispatch statistics to the Planning Commission which showed how many times law
enforcement agencies had to respond to different incidents in different areas. The
statistics showed that for the year 2003 there had been no incidents at the Cedar
Ridge facility which required law enforcement to respond. On the other hand, the
Aspen Meadows Trailer Court, which is closer to the properties of the objecting
neighbors than the Hancocks' proposed facility, generated fifty-seven

incidents

requiring response from law-enforcement officials. These incidents included
domestic violence, theft and vandalism. (R. at 11:114-38)
Site factors for the Hancock Parcel (utilities, law enforcement response
time, fire response time, medical response time, distances to hospital and nearest
highway and fire protection arrangements) are either identical to or more favorable
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than the same site factors for Cedar Ridge RTC. (R. at 6; R. at 13)

The

conditions listed in the CUP issued by the Planning Commission on December 3,
2003 include conditions intended to further insure the safety of the community.
Those conditions require the Hancocks to install an alarm system sufficient to
control students; to establish and conduct monthly public-relations meetings with
the local community; to provide proof of liability insurance; and to comply with
all state, federal and local regulations pertinent to residential treatment centers.
On the issue of safety, the Planning Commission clearly received and
considered reliable and relevant evidence sufficient to support its finding that the
Uintah Mountain RTC will not be detrimental to the public health, safety or
general welfare of the residents of Duchesne County. The evidence on which the
County relied to find that the ten-bed facility would be detrimental to the safety of
the residents of Duchesne County consisted entirely of non-factual "public
clamor" which is insufficient as a matter of law to support such a finding. The
County's finding on this issue must therefore be reversed.
4. The decision of the County to limit the Uintah Mountain RTC to no more
than ten students is illegal because it does not serve a legitimate public
purpose.
There are limitations in establishing conditions of approval when a
conditional use permit is issued: (1) the jurisdiction must be acting within its
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f 3.16 of the Hancocks' Petition for Review; admitted by the County in its
Answer.
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police powers; (2) the condition must substantially further a legitimate public
purpose; (3) the condition must further the same public purpose for which it was
imposed; and (4) the property owner may not be required to carry a
disproportionate burden in furthering the public purpose. California Land-Use and
Planning Law, 9th Edition.
If a condition applied to a conditional use permit is not linked to
some legitimate public need or burden the project creates, the condition imposed
could be deemed a taking of property in violation of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.
825; 107 S. Ct. 3141; 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) Where a regulatory taking has been
found to occur, the courts will overturn the agency's action and may require the
agency to pay the applicant compensation for the taking. Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, supra. See also, Diamond B-YRanches v. Tooele County, 91
P.3d 841 (Utah App. 2004).
At the November 5, 2003 public hearing the Hancocks requested that
Uintah Mountain RTC be allowed to house up to fifty clients. There was
absolutely no evidence presented by anyone in opposition indicating that this
would be a detrimental, dangerous, unfair or unreasonable number. Further, the
Planning Commission made no findings justifying limiting Uintah Mountain RTC
to ten students. Such a limitation will make the program economically impractical
and is tantamount to denying the CUP application in its entirety. (R. at 12: 343)
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The Planning Commission's decision to limit the number of students to ten
was apparently based on their understanding of the number of students who could
be housed in the existing structure. The conditional use permit application had
nothing to do with any particular structure, but rather how the land would be
utilized. The County is also familiar with the growth of the residential treatment
programs at Cedar Ridge. This facility has been operating in Duchesne County for
several years. Cedar Ridge slowly grew by adding additional residential structures
to the property as they were able to attract additional students. Observance of the
Cedar Ridge property would show a typical rural neighborhood. Cedar Ridge
currently has approximately 50 beds available for students. The County did not
limit Cedar Ridge in the number of students it could house and gave the program
the flexibility to grow responsibly. Cedar Ridge is used as an example because it
caters to a virtually identical student population and has operated in the County
without mishap in a similar, although less advantageous, location as the Hancock
property. (R. at 12: 344)
The County evidently believes that the Hancocks should have gone to the
expense of engaging an architect, structural engineer, landscaper and other
professionals to prepare plans and diagrams for the larger facility for which they
sought a conditional use permit. Such a requirement, if enforced, would place an
insurmountable obstacle in the path of the Hancocks. They will be obliged to
spend thousands of dollars to design a facility without knowing if the Planning
Commission and the County would approve the facility. The appropriate response
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would have been to issue the conditional use permit but with conditions which
would have required the Hancocks to return to the Planning Commission as the
project progressed to get approval for the facility and its operational procedures.
To hold otherwise would require the Hancocks to guess as to what might satisfy
the County and then, if they guessed wrong, either give up their project or spend
more money again trying to guess what the County might approve.
To the extent that a larger facility would create safety issues, traffic
problems, or raise questions concerning compatibility of use, those concerns and
questions and problems can all be addressed by attaching conditions to the
issuance of the permit, but they should not be used as a rationalization for denying
a conditional use permit altogether simply because of public clamor.
The County's decision to limit the Hancocks' CUP to ten students serves no
legitimate public interest, is manifestly illegal and must be reversed.
5. The decision of the Duchesne County Commission to deny the Hancocks a
CUP for Uintah Mountain RTC was based on the familial status of the
persons who will reside at the facility; was a violation of both the federal
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. and Utah's Fair Housing Act,
Utah Code § 57-21-1 et seq.; and was therefore illegal.
Both the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. ("FHA") and
the Utah Fair Housing Act, Utah Code § 57-21-1 et seq. ("Utah FHA") prohibit
discriminatory housing practices based on "familial status." The FHA designates
"familial status" as (1) one or more minors (2) "domiciled with" (3) a parent or
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legal custodian or the designee of parent or custodian. Id. 3602(k). [emphasis
supplied]. The Utah FHA contains the same definition. Utah Code § 57-21-2 (14).
The Uintah Mountain RTC satisfies the first element: one or more minors
will be residing in the home.
"Familial status" also requires that the minors be domiciled with their
caretaker. Two "house parents" will occupy the proposed treatment facility. The
house parents will live at the home with the residents on a full time basis and treat
the dwelling as their home. (R. at 11:13) Domicile is established by physical
presence with the intent to remain and make the dwelling their home. See
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holy field, 490 U.S. 30, 109 S. Ct. 1597,
104 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1988); see alsoy Cronley v. Glaze, 710 F. 2d 676, 678 (10th Cir.
1983); and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 15. Thus, the proposed
facility meets the "domiciled with" requirement of the FHA and the Utah FHA.
Finally, the minors will be living with the house parents at the designation
of their parent(s) or custodian. Accordingly, the proposed facility will qualify for
"familial status" under the FHA and the Utah FHA. See, Children's Alliance v.
City ofBellevue, 950 F. Supp. 1491, 1495 n.4 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (refusing to
revisit the court's previous (unpublished) holding that the "residents of group
homes for youth are encompassed by the FHA's definition of "familial status.")
The federal FHA makes it unlawful to "make unavailable or deny a
dwelling because of familial status". To make a prima facie case under the FHA,
a plaintiff must show either discriminatory treatment or discriminatory effect alone
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without proof of discriminatory intent. Doe v. City of Butler, PA., 892 F.2d 315,
323 (3 rd Cir. 1989). The record is absolutely replete with evidence of both
discriminatory treatment and discriminatory effect.
If a family of ten boys between the ages of twelve and seventeen, each of
whom demonstrated obesity, low self-esteem, poor academic performance, poor
family relationships, depression, experimental drug and/or alcohol use and/or
attention deficit hyper-activity disorder—emotional problems extremely common
among modern teenagers—such a family would be permitted to reside in a single
family residence in the Hancock Cove area without any required governmental
approval. On the other hand, if ten unrelated boys between the ages of twelve and
seventeen demonstrating exactly the same emotional problems as the ten brothers
desired to reside in the Hancock Cove area in a residential treatment center, they
would not be permitted to do so. The only difference between the family of ten
brothers and the ten unrelated boys desiring to live in the residential treatment
center is familial status. It is difficult to imagine a more flagrant violation of the
FHA.
Even a cursory review of the letters and testimony submitted by the
neighbors opposing the Uintah Mountain RTC shows an obviously discriminatory
animus. The arguments which the neighbors made were anecdotal and based on
vague and irrational fears. They are moreover the same arguments which were
made years ago when the FHA was used to enable Afro-Americans to overcome
local governmental roadblocks to desegregation. Thirty years ago residents in
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white-only neighborhoods argued that allowing blacks into their neighborhood
would increase crime, lower property values, and threaten the health and safety of
their children. The courts properly regarded these objections as utter nonsense and
this Court here should adopt the same response to the "public clamor" of the
neighbors in this case.
In more recent years neighbors have vehemently protested the
establishment of hospices for patients in the terminal stages of acquired immune
deficiency syndrome ("AIDS"). For example, in A.F.A.P.S. v. Regulations, and
Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95 (D. Puerto Rico 1990), a group of AIDS patients
and a non-profit corporation dedicated to providing emotional, practical, and
medical assistance to AIDS patients attempted to open an AIDS hospice in Puerto
Rico. Like the Hancocks in this case, the plaintiffs were obliged to apply for a
special use permit to operate the hospice and, like the neighbors in this case,
residents of the neighborhood in which the hospice was to be located presented
"organized and vocal opposition". The special use permit was denied by the
defendant and the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, alleging a violation of the
FHA. The district court for the district of Puerto Rico had no difficulty piercing
the "public clamor" of the neighbors in that case and ordered that a special use
permit be issued to the plaintiffs. Concerning the public clamor, the court made
this observation:
We agree with defendants to the extent that in the ordinary course of
affairs a decision maker is not to be saddled with every prejudice
and misapprehension of the people he or she serves and represents.
32

On the other hand, a decision maker has a duty not to allow illegal
prejudices of the majority to influence the decision making process.
A racially discriminatory act would be no less illegal simply because
it enjoys broad political support. Likewise, if an official act is
performed simply in order to appease the discriminatory viewpoints
of private parties, that act itself becomes tainted with discriminatory
intent even if the decision maker personally has no strong views on
the matter.
740 F. Supp at 104.
Operators of residential group homes for recovering alcoholics and
recovering drug users have faced this same sort of organized and vocal opposition
channeled through municipal land use decisions. For example, in United States v.
Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1991J, the United States District Court
imposed a $10,000 civil penalty on a city for violating the FHA by requiring
operators of a residential group home for recovering alcoholics and drug users to
either apply for a variance or vacate the property on which they were then living.
In Oxford House, Inc., v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1186
(E.D.N.Y. 1993), the court held that the town failed to make a reasonable
accommodation in violation of the FHA because the Town's code prohibited
rooming houses or boarding houses in multifamily and single family zones. In
Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 456 (D.N.J.
1992), the court struck down a zoning ordinance because it imposed more
stringent requirements on groups of unrelated individuals than related individuals
in the way it defined "family" and because of the effects the definition of "family"
had on securing housing in residential zones. The cases presented indicate that
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when a county's definition of "family" makes no allowance for a reasonable
accommodation for group homes, it is likely to be found in violation of the FHA.
The County's zoning ordinance as applied violates the FHA. Individuals
seeking housing in the context of a group home environment are placed at a
substantial disadvantage in attempting to secure housing in Duchesne County. The
burden is on the County to justify the disparate treatment and impact its
ordinances have on a particular group. The mere fact that the County requires that
residents of group homes and/or residential treatment centers apply for a
conditional use permit prior to obtaining housing in the county and does not
require that other groups of related or unrelated persons undergo the same process
is a violation of the FHA.
If requiring the Hancocks to obtain a CUP for a group home is a prima
facie violation of the federal FHA and the Utah FHA, as it appears to be under
existing law, then surely the denial of the Hancocks' CUP application was grossly
illegal and this Court has no alternative but to reinstate their CUP and allow them
to move forward with the Uintah Mountain RTC.
The Uintah Mountain RTC stands on no less strong a footing than an AIDS
hospice or a group home for recovering substance abusers. The public clamor and
opposition raised in response to all three kinds of facilities is substantially
identical and the results in each case should also be identical. This Court should
have no difficulty holding that the decision of the County to deny a conditional use
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permit for the Uintah Mountain RTC was a flagrant violation of federal and state
Fair Housing Acts.
CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, individually and collectively, this Court
should reverse the County's decision and order that the CUP issued by the
Planning Commission be reinstated and modified to allow the Hancocks to house
up to forty additional students in living quarters to be constructed in the future.
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Duchesne County
Diane Freston, the Duchesne County Clerk
734 North Center
Drawer 910
Duchesne, Utah 84021-0910

You are hereby summoned and required to file a response in writing to the attached
Petition with the above entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to plaintiffs attorney, Eric G.
Easterly, 1795 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 201, Park City, Utah, 84060, a copy of said response
within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. If you fail to do so, judgment
by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in said Petition, which has been filed
with the Clerk of said Court and is attached hereto and herewith served upon you.

DATED this

day of May, 2004.
ERIC G. EASTERLY
Attorneys for Petitioners

Exhibit 2

RECEIVED
Roland Uresk
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney
PO Box 346
Duchesne, Utah 84021
(435)738-1145

FILED
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DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

JUN 2 3 200*1
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Law Offices of Eric G. Easterly
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(
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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH
UINTAH MOUNTAIN RTC, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company; D. BRAD HANCOCK; JOHN
D. HANCOCK; TYSON B. HANCOCK: and
BEAU D. HANCOCK,
Petitioners,

ANSWER

Vs
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of Utah,
Respondent

COMES NOW the Respondent, by and through its Deputy County Attorney,
Roland Uresk, and admits allegations contained in paragraphs 1.1-1.4, 2.1-2.2, 3.1-3.10,
3.12-3.14,3.16-3.22, and 3.35.
Respondent denies allegations contained in paragraphs 3.11, 3.15, 3.23, 3.24, and
3.26-3.37.
Wherefore, respondent requests this matter be set for pretrial, to set a date for
designation of record and briefing schedule.
Dated this 2 - ^ d a y of June, 2004.
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Roland Uresk
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney
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BEFORE THE DUCHESNE COUNTY COMMISSION
)

IN RE: THE APPLICATION OF
UINTAH MOUNTAIN
RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT
CENTER

)

DECISION ON APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)

This matter came before the Duchesne County Commission on March 9th, 2004, for
hearing on appeals from a decision of the Duchesne County Planning Commission granting
Uintah Mountain Residential Treatment Center a conditional use permit to allow a residential
treatment center in an area zoned A-5, an agricultural-residential area, with the conditions that it
follow the plan proposed, it was limited to the structure proposed, and it was not to exceed a
capacity often (lO)clients. The neighbors appealed the decision as not supported by the
evidence, and the Hancock's, proponents of the residential treatment center, appealed the
decision on the basis that the establishment of a limit often (10) clients was arbitrary and
capricious. We are now asked to determine if the Planning Commission was in error in its
consideration of the request, and, if so, in what way was the Planning Commission in error.
THE LAW
Duchesne County has adopted a zoning ordinance designating certain uses in certain
areas. This was done to promote harmony and compatibility between neighbors by limiting uses
of ones property to uses that are compatible with the surrounding area. The area in question is
zoned A-5. The A-5 zone has a 5 acre minimum, and is provided and designed to protect and
encourage the continued use of land for agricultural purposes and to discourage the preemption
of agricultural land for other uses. Other purposes of this district include the protection of the
economic base of the county for such uses as forestry, oil and gas drilling, pipelines, petroleum
storage and distribution and the protection of significant natural features of land, creeks, lakes,
wetlands, air and the preservation of open areas for wildlife habitat, and range livestock. This
district is characterized by production farms and ranches including smaller hobby farms.
...Representative of the uses within this district is family dwellings, barns, corrals, crops,
livestock raising, farm dwellings, dude ranches, produce retail sales, and petroleum drilling and
storage. The proposed use of the property by the Hancock's as a "residential treatment center"
is not a permitted use in this area. The Duchesne County zoning ordinance does allow for
certain conditional uses within this zone.
The Duchesne County Zoning ordinance does not directly address "residential treatment
centers", but the Planning Office found "residential treatment centers" to be very similar to the
use as a group home. Our zoning ordinance does allow a group home in an A-5 zone as a
conditional use under certain conditions. See Duchesne County Code Section 17.52.030.

All applications for a group home must contain the following information, and no
application will be considered complete which does not contain the following:
(1)
Name and Address of the applicant.
(2)
Statement of ownership of the subject property executed by the owner or owner's
agent.
(3)
Description of the property, including a legal description and address, and
common means of identification.
(4)
A map of the boundaries of the parcel and each separate lot or parcel within three
hundred feet of the exterior boundaries thereof, together with a list of the names
and addresses of the last know owners of public record of each parcel.
(5)
A statement indicating the precise manner of compliance with each of the
applicable provisions of this ordinance.
(6)
A statement from the appropriate regulatory agency concerning availability of
public utilities including culinary and irrigation water (including appropriate fire
protection),power sewage disposal and refuse disposal.
(7)
A detailed written description of the anticipated ages and total number of
occupants of the facility, together with a diagram of the facility including all
separate rooms and the intended use of each room.
(8)
A detailed description of number of intended staff and job descriptions for such
staff.
(9)
A statement demonstrating the capability of the applicant, through insurance or
other means, to insure timely restitution to any member of the public suffering
damage as a result of intentional or negligent conduct by members of the staff or
residents of the facility.
(10) A statement demonstrating compliance with all required state and federal
licensing requirements as required.
(11) Police check demonstrating all criminal convictions or pleas of nolo contendere
except those which have been expunged, for five years prior to the date of
application.
Section 17.52.050 of the Duchesne County Code states, "The Planning Commission may
grant a conditional use permit in compliance with the zoning ordinance if, from the application
and the facts presented at the public hearing, it finds:
(1)
The proposed use at the proposed location will not be unduly detrimental or
injurious to property or improvements in the vicinity and will not be detrimental
to the public health, safety or general welfare.
(2)
The proposed use will be located and conducted in compliance with the goals and
policies of the Duchesne County General Plan and the purposes of this ordinance.
(3)
That the property for which the use, building or other structure is proposed is of
adequate size and dimensions to permit the conduct of the use in such a manner
that will not be materially detrimental to adjoining and surrounding properties."
The Planning Commission also needed to address special minimum conditions for a group home,
as set forth in Section 17.52.052 of the Duchesne County Code. Those special minimum
conditions are as follows:
(1)
The location of the proposed use is compatible to other land uses in the general
neighborhood.
(2)
The site is of sufficient size to accommodate the proposed use together with all

(3)
(4)

yards, open spaces, walls and fences, parking and loading facilities, landscaping
as required by the ordinance.
The site shall be served by streets of sufficient capacity to carry the traffic
generated by the proposed use.
The proposed use, if it complies with all conditions of which approval is made
contingent, will not adversely affect other property in the vicinity of the general
welfare of the county.
THE NEIGHBORHOOD

The proposed location of the Hancock facility is in an area known as Hancock Cove. It is
Zoned A-5, an agricultural and residential zone. The subdivisions in the area all have restrictive
covenants promoting single family residences with large acreage and a rural, pastoral lifestyle. It
has single family residences with large lots, which provides open space. It has no commercial
facilities except a few home occupations. There are also large tracts of agricultural land with
single family residences. It is one of the fastest growing areas in the county for single family
residences on large lots. It still retains its agricultural character, and is populated by many
families with young children. It is serviced by a culinary water system through Roosevelt City,
but has no sewer system. Sewer services are by means of septic systems. It is clearly a
residential-agricultural area.
THE PROPOSED USE
The proposal under consideration is a request for a conditional use permit to operate a
residential treatment center on five (5) acres owned by the Hancocks. The treatment center will
house young men between the ages of 12 to 17 for periods of time up to twenty four (24) months.
The young men will reside on the property, will be educated through a home school program
conducted on the property, and will be under 24 hour/ 7 day per week supervision by "house
parents". The services to be provided are therapy, education, skills development; and recreation;
all to take place on the premises. Uintah Mountain Residential Treatment Center is designed to
provide treatment for the following issues:
1.
Low self esteem;
2.
Obesity;
3.
Depression;
4.
Drop in Academic performance;
5.
ADHD;
6.
Experimental drug and/or alcohol use; and
7.
Breakdown in family relationships
Uintah Mountain will not accept applicants who have a history of violence, who are sexual
offenders and/or who have a significant criminal background. The application had attached to it
a drawing of an existing single family structure that was remodeled to fit the purposes of a
residential treatment center. No number was submitted with the application or the subsequent
plan as to the capacity of the residential treatment center. The use is a residential treatment
center located on five (5) acres, and operated as a business, by private individuals, that will
house young men in need of treatment and therapy for personal issues.
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PLANNING COMMISSION DECISION
The Duchesne County Planning Commission held two (2) hearings on this mater, one
November 5th 2003 the other December 3 rd , 2003.At these meetings both the neighbors and the
Hancocks were able to present evidence as to their respective positions. At the conclusion of the
December 3rd meeting the Planning Commission made its findings and granted the Hancocks a
conditional use permit for one structure on five acres with a limitation on capacity of not to
exceed ten (10) young men or, if less, the maximum allowed by the State of Utah for the one
structure.
DISCUSSION
Both sides in this mater, the neighbors and the Hancock's, have appealed this matter to
the County Commission; each taking issue with the decision of the Planning Commission. We
have held a public hearing on this matter March 9th, 2004, and have had an opportunity to review
the record including all submissions and the transcripts of the hearings before the Planning
Commission. There are several concerns by the neighbors and the Hancocks. We will address
each in turn.
Public Clamor
This proposal has a lot of interest in the neighborhood, as is evidenced by the attendance
at the public hearings. The neighbors have been very vocal in their opposition to the Hancocks'
proposal. The Hancocks characterize this as merely public clamor, which by law cannot be the
sole basis for the decision. We have listened to and have reviewed the comments of the
neighbors provided either in the public hearings or in submissions during the process. To the
extent that these comments are based on mere speculation, we give them minimal value, for this
is public clamor as we know it. The neighbors comments, however, will be given greater value
where they establish the character of the neighborhood, and raise legitimate concerns about
safety, traffic and the effect on the neighborhood., and where they are supported by other
evidence.
The Application
We have reviewed the application of the Hancocks and have concerns about the
application being incomplete, particularly subsections (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) of Section
17.40.020 of the Duchesne County Code. These requirements were either not provided or were
provided only for the single structure on five (5) acres. Subsection (7) of Section 17.40.020 of
the Duchesne County Code specifically requires "a detailed written description of the anticipated
ages and total number of occupants of the facility, together with a diagram of the facility
including all separate rooms and the intended use of each room". No diagram was submitted for
any number greater than ten (10). It is obvious from the record that many things in the
application were not complete, as questions had to be asked, and comments were made by the
planning commission members, as to what was actually being proposed. It is clear that the
Planning Commission granted the conditional use permit based on what they had in front of them
at the time, and what the Hancocks stated was the maximum number of young men that could be
housed in the existing structure. Even though there was mention, in the record, of building
another building on the five acre parcel, there was no diagram submitted for that structure or any
future structures. The Planning Commission did not have an opportunity to fully evaluate
anything other that the single structure on five acres, as that was all thatwas presented to them in
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the application. We are troubled by the lack of a detailed plan outlining the complete project,
including a detailed description of the staff, numbers, evidence of compliance with required state
and federal regulations, and statements from the appropriate regulatory agencies concerning
availability of public utilities including culinary and irrigation water (including appropriate fire
protection), power, sewage disposal and refuse disposal.
Limit of Ten
The Hancocks' appeal claims that the Planning Commission's decision setting the
maximum number of young men who could be housed at the facility at ten (10) was arbitrary and
capricious. No where in the written application was there a number provided, even though it was
required. It was only in the hearings that numbers were discussed, and those numbers ranged
from 5 to 50. Of relevance here is the numbers ten (10) and sixteen (16) that were discussed in
the hearings. The Hancocks stated that ten (10) was the maximum number that the single
structure could house, and that sixteen (16) was the number that was required to be financially
viable. As was stated earlier, the application and the plans submitted did not address anything
but the single structure. The Planning Commission's limitation to ten (10) clients was not
arbitrary nor capricious. We are concerned that the number ten (10) would not be sufficient to
make the project financially feasible. In our opinion to approve a project that is not financially
feasible is not good planning.
The Findines
Before a conditional use permit can be issued Sections 17.52.050 and 17.52.053 of the
Duchesne County Code require certain findings and conditions, including special minimum
conditions that must be met. We have reviewed the record and are prepared to address the
findings.
We set forth the special minimum conditions required above in the section entitled 'The
Law". We have concerns about number (1) and (4) and to some extent (2) and (3). There is
sufficient evidence in the record to support condition (2) regarding sufficient size and condition
(3) regarding streets sufficient to carry the traffic generated by the use as it is presently granted,
ie., a single residence structure on five acres with a maximum of 10 young men. We, however,
cannot find in the record any evidence that would support such findings for a larger operation.
The concerns of the neighbors about increased traffic are valid, especially in light of the fact that
the State of Utah requires 1 staff member for each 4 clients at all times. There is no evidence in
the plans submitted regarding adequate parking or roads or any mention about addressing the
issue of increased traffic. Our review of this matter is hampered by the lack of a complete plan
for the use requested.
We now look to conditions (1) and (4), location is compatible with other land uses in the
general neighborhood, and the proposed use with conditions will not adversely affect other
property in the vicinity or the general welfare of the county. It is clear from the submissions of
the neighbors that the use in this area is single family dwellings on large lots with much open
space. Developers in the Hancock Cove area have kept to this standard in the past twenty years
and the zoning has been to encourage this type of use. The Planning Commission approved the
modified single family residence on the five acres for the conditional use. This, we think, was in
keeping with the character of the neighborhood. We are troubled, however, that even with this
structure will the use be compatible with other uses. This facility will need fences, parking, and
attendant sheds and structures to house so many young men. The neighbors have also raised the
issues of safety. No matter how you characterize it this is a facility for troubled youth, and
troubled youth have their problems. There is evidence in the record that these types of facilities
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do have escapees and sometimes the escapees cause injury to persons and property. We see no
evidence in the record that these issues have been addressed in a manner that will be compatible
with the permitted uses in this area, or will not adversely affect other property in the vicinity.
The issues that must be addressed in the special minimum conditions also bring into
question the finding of Section 17.52.050 (1) That the proposed use at the proposed location will
not be unduly detrimental or injurious to property or improvements in the vicinity and will not be
detrimental to the public health, safety or general welfare. The issues of safety, traffic and
compatibility of either the single structure or the larger project were not adequately addressed.
The Process
We have been troubled at the outset of this matter with the lack of a definite plan for the
proposed use of the five acres for a residential treatment center. It appears from the record that
the Planning Commission had similar troubles and addressed them with questions at the time of
the public hearings. Zoning is established to ensure compatible uses of properties in a defined
district. Conditional use permits allow uses that are not normally compatible , but can be if
certain conditions are met. By its nature this process requires a full and complete disclosure of
the use both present and anticipated future uses to allow for a full and complete examination of
the use and an accurate determination that the use can be compatible with the enumerated
conditions. Neither the Planning Commission nor the County Commission can determine what
is has not been properly put before it. That is why, by ordinance, we have established the
criteria for an application for a conditional use permit. The Hancocks have argued that they
needed the conditional use permit before they could obtain the licensing from the State of Utah,
and submit a complete plan. We disagree with this approach. A complete plan could have been
submitted to both the State of Utah and to the Planning Commission, and the State could have
given tentative approval for the plan sufficient to satisfy our county ordinances. Through out the
record and at the appeal hearing the Hancocks requested no limitations. It appears that they
approached this matter in a piecemeal manner. They suggested several times that they would
take a little now and come back later. This is like letting the camel get his nose in the tent. The
next thing you know the whole camel is in the tent with you. We do not agree with this
approach because it is not conducive to good planning. The process would have been better
served if the entire plan had been disclosed and the application process had been complete in its
entirety.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the record and considered all submissions, and have discussed all of
the issues of concern. In regards to the Hancock appeal, claiming that the Planning
Commission's limitation on the capacity of the treatment center was arbitrary and capricious, we
find that the Planning Commission granted the Hancocks what they asked for and what could be
substantiated from the application. The limit often (10) was also the maximum allowed for the
single structure. No other evidence was presented to support a larger facility to accommodate
16 or 50 young men. We find no evidence that the Planning Commission's limitation was
arbitrary or capricious, and therefore we deny the appeal of the Hancocks.
In regards to the appeal of the neighbors, that the Planning Commission's desision was
not supported by the evidence, we find that there was insufficient evidence provided to address
the issues of safety, traffic and compatibility of the use to justify making the findings necessary
to grant the conditional use. The area is clearly residential and agricultural, and from all that was
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presented we find that the Hancocks proposals are a commercial venture and not compatible with
the area. The Planning Commission found that the single structure on five acres could be
compatible with the area, if they met certain conditions. We agree that a single structure on five
acres could be compatible to the area, but we disagree that this project could be compatible. It is
clear that the single structure on five acres is inadequate for the Hancocks' needs and that a
larger project will be needed to be a viable venture. There has been nothing presented in the
application, the two hearings before the Planning Commission, or the hearing before us, the
County Commission, to convince us that the Uintah Mountain Residential Treatment Center, is a
viable project, nor could it be a compatible use in this area. We, therefore, overturn the decision
of the planning commission and deny the conditional use permit issued for the Uintah Mountain
Residential Treatment Center in the Hancock Cove area.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH MOUNTAIN RTC, LLC,
a Utah limited liability company; D.
BRAD HANCOCK; JOHN D. HANCOCK;
TYSON B. HANCOCK; AND BEAU
D. HANCOCK,

RULING

Petitioners,
vs.
Case No. 040800030
DUCHESNE COUNTY, apolitical
subdivision of the State of Utah.
Respondent.

Judge John R. Anderson

The Petitioners appeal the denial of a conditional use permit for the operation of a
residential treatment facility in a 5 acre lot zoned for residential / agricultural use. The matter
having come before the court for hearing on December 12, 2004. The Court having received
argument, having reviewed the pleadings, and being otherwise fully informed, enters the
following:
The issues before the Court are 1) whether the actions of the Duchesne County
Commission in denying the Petitioners' application for a conditional use permit are illegal under
the Fair Housing Act; and 2) whether the denial of the conditional in excess or 10 students and
the denial of the permit in its entirety was arbitrary and capricious. The standard at which this
Court must review the actions of the Duchesne County Commission is found in UTAH CODE
ANN. § 17-27-708, which provides this review is limited to a determination of whether the above
actions were arbitrary and capricious, or illegal. The decision would be considered arbitrary and
capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence, which is considered the quantum and
quality of evidence required to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
I. Fair Housing Act
The Petitioners argue the denial of the conditional use permit is illegal as a violation of
the Federal Fair Housing Act 43 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., and the Utah Fair Housing Act UTAH

§ 57-21-1 et seq., because the decision denies housing to a group of individuals who
do not share familial status. However, no where in the record is there any evidence that the
decision to deny the permit was based on the potential residents' lack of familial status. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that the Commission used any definition of family or
relationship in making the decision to deny the permit. The zoning ordinance does not limit the
number of residents in a group home, or define the relationship to be considered a family - by
limiting the number or relationship of the individuals. Instead, the decision regarding the
limitation of the structures or number of persons allowed to live in a single-family group home
was made based on square footage and supervision (teacher/student ration 1:4). There is no
evidence in the record that the decision was made based on familial status. The Petitioners are
seeking a permit for a commercial venture that is not allowed within the A-5 agricultural
residential 5 acre minimum zone. The Fair Housing Act was not intended to apply to this
situation, but to prohibit discrimination in providing residential housing. The Petitioners'
argument therefore fails.
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II. Denial of the Conditional Use Permit in Excess of 10 Students and In Its Entirety
The Duchesne County Code 17.40.020(7) requires "a detailed written description of the
anticipated ages and total number of occupants of the facility, together with a diagram of the
facility including all separate rooms and the intended use of each room." The only evidence
presented to the Commission was in relation to the single structure presently existing on the
parcel. The Petitioner indicated that the treatment center would house anywhere from 12 to 50
students, that the center needed 16 students to be economically viable. However, the existing
structure, pursuant to state rules and regulations could only house a maximum number of 10
students. At no time were there any diagrams or plans presented on how to house up to 50
students. The only plans submitted were that for the renovated structure on the site. Specifically,
as the Commission's written decision indicates, there was a 'lack of a detailed plan outlining the
complete project, including a detailed description of the staff numbers, evidence of compliance
with required state and federal regulations, and statements from the appropriate regulatory
agencies concerning availability of public utilities including culinary and irrigation water
(including appropriate fire protection), power, sewage disposal and refuse disposal."
The Petitioners argue providing detailed plans would be costly and any future changes to
the structure could be handled by listing conditions in the use permit. While the written decision
of the Duchesne County Commission indicated that a 10 youth facility could be compatible with
the purpose of the location, the proposed group home needed to house 16 youth to be
economically viable. The group home was not economically viable in the presented current
condition (only housing up to 10 youth). In order to service more youth, there would need to be
additional structures/housing, which would then not be compatible with the single-family use of
the area. Therefore, it would not have made any difference if there had been a condition attached

which required the Petitioner to return to seek approval of any expansion. As mentioned above,
the only evidence presented to the Commission was in relation to the presently existing
renovated structure on the parcel, which could by law only house up to 10 students. Based upon
the above, the Commission's decision to not grant a conditional use permit in excess of 10
students was not arbitrary and capricious.
The denial of the conditional use permit in its entirety was not arbitrary and capricious as
there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. The Petitioners argue that
the only evidence before the Commission to warrant denial was concerns from the neighbors or
"public clamor." In support of this, the Petitioners cite to Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756
P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), which held that citizen opposition alone is an insufficient basis
for denial of permit. In the case sub judice, there is more than simple public clamor. As the
Respondent points out, the record contains evidence in the form of a letter from Mr. Dale
Cameron regarding the effect the treatment center would have on the surrounding properties.
There was evidence presented to the Commission regarding safety concerns for these types of
facilities. There was evidence presented regarding a nearby facility and some incidents that took
place at that facility. It cannot be said from the evidence that the proposed facility would not be
detrimental to the surrounding properties. Therefore, the evidence supports the Commission's
denial of the conditional use permit in its entirety.
Based upon the above, and the reasoning contained in the Respondent's Brief, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision of the Duchesne County Commission is affirmed.

Dated this 7^> day of December. 2004.
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Thursday, December 23, 2004

Brad Hancock
1476 West Memory Lane
4157-9 Roosevelt, Utah 84066
John D. Hancock, Esq.
2625 Wigwam Parkway, Suite 102
Henderson, Nevada 89074

Re: Uintah Mountain v. Duchesne County
Dear Brad & John:
I am distressed to report that Judge Anderson has ruled against us on all issues raised by
our appeal. I am enclosing a copy of his ruling. I think frankly that it is a very poorly written
opinion. There is virtually no real legal analysis. He seems to have ignored both the facts and
law. I strongly urge you to consider appealing the ruling. It won't cost a great deal since the
briefing has essentially been done and the record already assembled.
Sorry for the bad news. My best to you and your families for the holidays.

ERIC G. EASTERLY

EGE:nll
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